How to use GitHub Actions with security in mind

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https://myoctocat.com

How to use GitHub Actions with security in mind

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What are GitHub workflows?

Execute one or more Actions

Workflows triggered by events:

- Push
- Comment
- Creating an Issue
- Release
- Etc.


What are GitHub Actions?

Steps in the workflows

• Basis: Run a shell script

- Create your own
- Use an existing one from the marketplace





Workflow example

```
dotnetcore-webapp / .github / workflows / dotnetcore.yml
ያ main ▾
    name: .NET Core
    on: [push]
     jobs:
      build-and-deploy:
        environment: Production
9
        runs-on: ubuntu-latest
10
        steps:
         - uses: actions/checkout@v1
         - name: Setup .NET Core
13
          uses: actions/setup-dotnet@v1
14
          with:
            dotnet-version: 3.0.100
16
17
        # dotnet build
18
19

    name: Build with dotnet

          run:
            dotnet build --configuration Release ./dotnet-core-webapp/dotnetcore-webapp.csproj
```

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


GitHub Actions Security

- Repository security
- Runners and security
- Actions and security
- Forking actions
- Keeping up to date

Repository security

- Access to code
- Workflow secrets
- Your code



Code - Who has access?

Permission levels



No access

Read only access

Triage: manage issues & pull requests

Write access

Maintain: No sensitive or destructive actions


Admin: full access

Repository security

- Access to code
- Workflow secrets
- Your code

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Workflow secrets



Workflow secrets

Encrypted client side before reaching GitHub:

- Encrypted with the public key for your org or repo (created and stored by GitHub)
- Used when using the UI
- Encrypt yourself before posting to the REST API

Secrets are **not** shared to forked repositories

Who has access to your secrets?

For creating at repo level: Repository Owner access

For creating at org level: Admin access to the org

Set an access policy for the secrets:

- All repositories
- Private repositories
- Only selected repositories

Who has access to your secrets?

Encrypted until used, then injected as:


- An environment variable
- Direct input

Will be redacted in logs

Don't use structured data (like json): hard to redact

Who has access to your secrets?

- Actions can do anything with them!
- Anyone with access to the Action Logs should be considered to have access to your secrets



Repository security

- Access to code
- Workflow secrets
- Your code/repo

Your code

Anything in your repository:

- Workflow files
- Shell scripts
- Your own code
- Dependencies:
 - Packages
 - Containers

Best practices:

- Static code analysis
 - Check your own code!

- Third party dependency scanning
 - 99% of your code, is not yours:
 - Scan for known vulnerabilities
 - Keep your dependencies up to date!

Your code/repo – trace changes

Who made changes:

- Code: Git commit history


- Everything around your code is in the audit log

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Your code/repo — trace changes (org level)

Audit log:

- Access
- Secrets
- Access Tokens
- OAuth grants
- Enabling features
- Etc.



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Workflow Runners

Actions execute on runners

Self hosted

- Cloud / On premises hosted by yourself
- OS + Tools update = YOUR responsibility
- Enables specific environment setup
- No usage limits

GitHub hosted

- OS + Tools update = GitHub's responsibility
- Per minute rating applies after the free minutes
- Clean execution environment with every run

```
name: .NET Core Deploy to IIS
on:
  push:
   branches:
      - "self-hosted"
jobs:
 build-and-deploy:
   runs-on: self-hosted
   steps:
    uses: actions/checkout@v1
    - name: Setup .NET Core
      uses: actions/setup-dotnet@v1
     with:
       dotnet-version: 3.0.100
```

```
1  name: .NET Core
2
3  on: [push]
4
5  jobs:
6  build-and-deploy:
7
8  runs-on: ubuntu-latest
9
10  steps:
11  - uses: actions/checkout@v1
12  - name: Setup .NET Core
13  uses: actions/setup-dotnet@v1
14  with:
15  dotnet-version: 3.0.100
```

Workflow Runners

Security

- Environment scope
 - Network
 - Shared state between runs

• User: limit its access!

Best practice: Run the action inside of a container

```
jobs:
    my_first_job:
    steps:
        - name: My first step
        uses: docker://gcr.io/cloud-builders/gradle
```

```
test-box:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    container:
     image: azul/zulu-openjdk-alpine:8-jre
· · steps: · ·
     uses: actions/checkout@v2
     name: What OS is running
     run: uname -a
     name: What java version do we have
      run: java -version
```

Workflow runners

Best practice: Don't use self hosted runners for public repositories

Example:

- Your repo
- New fork
- Adds malicious code
- Create pull request to your repo
- Workflow is executed on your self hosted runner?

Persisting data between runs

Run 1:

- Download dependencies
- Build the code
- Somehow overwrite the dependency cache

Run 2:

- Use cached dependencies
- Build the code
- Malicious dependency in build artefact

Solarwind attack:

https://xpir.it/Solorigate

Workflow runners – Best practice

Don't share runners (and machines!) between repositories:

• Run 1 can influence Run 2

Risks:

- Malicious programs
- Escaping the runner sandbox
- Exposing access to the (network) environment
- Persisting unwanted or dangerous data



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
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Marketplace or by direct url

aws

INSTALLATION



Pulls Issues Codespaces Marketplace Explore


Search or jump to...

https://github.com/aws-actions/amazon-eks-fargate

Learn more about this a

- name: EKS on Fargate

EKS on Fargate



Actions and security



Are you running just any action from the internet?



SCARY, especially in an Enterprise or on local runners

```
uses: shprink/nonharmful-and-must-have-actions@v1
with:
   my-secret: ${{ secrets.MY_SECRET }}
```

https://github.com/shprink/nonharmful-and-must-have-actions

If the repo has an action.yml, you can use it in your workflow

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
Manually:

- 1. Check the action repo code before use
- 2. Check its container images and dependencies before use

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Only use actions listed in the marketplace?

There is no real verification process for it ⊗



Actions

An entirely new way to automate your development workflow.

45 results for "z" filtered by

Actions x





OWASP ZAP Baseline Scan

By zaproxy 🚱 Scans the web ap 135 stars

with the OWASP ZAP Baseline Scan



Zeebe Action

By jwulf

A GitHub action to interact with Zeebe and Camunda Cloud 6 stars

Verified creator

GitHub has verified that this action was created by **pachyderm**.

Learn more about verified Actions.

Limiting actions altogether

Actions permissions

Allow all actions

Any action can be used, regardless of who authored it or whe

Disable Actions

The Actions tab is hidden and no workflows can run.

Allow local actions only

Only actions defined in a repository within rajbos can be used

Allow select actions

Only actions that match specified criteria can be used. Learn r

Actions permissions

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Disable Actions

The Actions tab is hidden and no workflows can run.

Allow local actions only

Only actions defined in a repository within rajbos can be used.

Allow select actions

Only actions that match specified criteria can be used. Learn more about allowing specific actions to run.


Allow actions created by GitHub

Allow Marketplace actions by verified creators

Allow specified actions

rajbos-actions/*,

Wildcards, tags, and SHAs are allowed. Examples: monalisa/octocat@*, monalisa/octocat@v2, monalisa/*



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Protective measures

Pin the action version:

uses: gaurav-nelson/github-action-markdown-link-check@v1

uses: gaurav-nelson/github-action-markdown-link-chec c@v1.0.1

Best practice: Pin the Action's commit SHA:

uses: gaurav-nelson/github-action-markdown-link-check@44a942b2f7ed0dc101d556f281e906fb79f1f478

Recommendation

Best practice: Limit to local actions and fork action repositories

- Also create a separate org to test actions in, before forking them
 - To enable DevOps teams to have the autonomy to test and verify themselves

Workflow attack vectors

Forks of public repos

Common fields

Forks of public repos

```
on:
       - push
                                                   Safe, runs on merge commit, read only access
       - pull request
       pull_request_target
 6
                                                   High risks! Runs on the target, has read +
                                                   write access and can access secrets
     jobs:
       build-and-deploy:
 9
         environment: PullRequestEnvironment
10
11
         runs-on: ubuntu-latest
12
13
         steps:
15
         - uses: actions/checkout@v1
```

https://xpir.it/gh-pwn-request

Common fields

github.event.issue.title github.event.issue.body github.event.pull_request.title github.event.pull_request.body github.event.comment.body github.event.review.body github.event.review_comment.body github.event.pages.*.page_name github.event.commits.*.message github.event.head_commit.message github.event.head_commit.author.email github.event.head_commit.author.name github.event.commits.*.author.email github.event.commits.*.author.name github.event.pull_request.head.ref github.event.pull_request.head.label github.event.pull_request.head.repo.default_branch github.head_ref

Common fields

```
- name: Check title
run: |
   title="${{ github.event.issue.title }}"
   if [[ ! $title =~ ^.*:\ .*$ ]]; then
      echo "Bad issue title"
      exit 1
   fi
```

Payload: a"; echo test

Remediation

```
- name: print title
env:
   TITLE: ${{ github.event.issue.title }}
run: echo "$TITLE"
```

https://xpir.it/actions-untrusted-input

GitHub Actions Security

Repository security
Runners and security
Actions and security

Forking actions

Keeping up to date



Forking actions

- Best practice: fork the action to a local (org) repo
- Limit actions to only local actions

Actions permissions Allow all actions Any action can be used, regardless of who authored it or where it is defined. Disable Actions The Actions tab is hidden and no workflows can run. Allow local actions only Only actions defined in a repository within rajbos can be used. Allow select actions Only actions that match specified criteria can be used. Learn more about allowing specific actions to run.

Forking actions

Pros:

- More secure
- Backup of actions that can be deleted or moved to a different org/repo

Cons:

- More maintenance work
 - Fork needs to be created
 - Kept up to date
- Limits the usage of new actions in your org, as someone create the new action (and by that take responsibility for enabling its use)

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GitHub Actions Security

Repository security
Runners and security
Actions and security

Forking actions
Keeping up to date

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Staying up to date

Follow @githubactions on Twitter!





Update action versions

Review the Action
 Use Actions + Commit SHA + Dependabot

2. Review the Action
Fork the Actions repo, update your forks and use Dependabot

Option 1: Use SHA + Dependabot


Best practice: Pin the Action's commit SHA:

uses: gaurav-nelson/github-action-markdown-link-check@44a942b2f7ed0dc101d556f281e906fb79f1f478

Add.github/dependabot.yml to the repo

```
#Dependabot will check the dependencies in this repo for updates
     version: 2
     updates:
         package-ecosystem: "github-actions
         -directory: "/"
         -schedule:
         --- # Check for updates to GitHub Actions every weekday
        ···interval: "daily"
9
10
11
     --- package-ecosystem: "nuget"
     ----directory: "/"
     ----schedule:
     ---- # Check for updates to on nuget packages every weekday
     ----interval: "daily"
```

Use Dependabot




Update action versions

Review the Action
 Use Actions + Commit SHA + Dependabot

2. Review the Action

Fork the Actions repo, update your forks and use Dependabot

Keep you forked action up to date



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Keep your forked action up to date


Fork a repo and automate it!

https://github.com/rajbos/github-fork-updater


Contains:

- Scheduled workflow
- Creates an issue
- Review the changes
- Label the issue
- Pull in changes

Creates issues




Review before merging



Automation

- Add a label
- Fork gets updated
- Issue gets closed



Pros of forking

- Backup of the action
- Full control over updates
- Pull in updates with validation centrally
- Only allow actions from your actions organization

- Skip commit SHA lookup and updating in every workflow
- Skip adding Dependabot in every repository

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Repository security
Runners and security
Actions and security

Forking actions
Keeping up to date

Best practices summarized

- Treat workflow secrets very carefully: best to think of them as public
- Review actions' source code
- Pin actions to commit SHA
- Don't trust incoming Pull Requests on public repos
- Fork the action repo and limit actions to local actions only
- Have an organization setup to test with
- Keep your forked actions up to date

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Next Solidify show

• 2021-06-04, #4, Modernizing your applications with Microsoft Azure

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Contact us at info@solidify.se if you want to know more or need help